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I INTRODUCTION 
[I]f the question is whether a given transaction is such as to attract a 
statutory benefit.. .or burden, such as income tax , I do not think it 
promotes clarity of thought to use terms like stratagem or device. The 
question is simply whether upon its true construction the statute applies 
to the transaction. Tax avoidance schemes are perhaps the best example. 
They either work .. . or they do not. If they do not work, the reason is 
simply that, upon the true construction of the statute, the transaction 
which was designed to avoid the charge to tax actually comes within it. 
It is not that the statute has a penumbral spirit which strikes down 
devices or stratagems designed to avoid its terms or exploit its 
loopholes. There is no need for such spooky judisprudence. 1 
Lord Hoffmann's statement in Norglen Ltd v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd2 
is here to stay, at least for a while. This has nothing to do with the 
importance or otherwise of the decision in Norglen Ltd v Reeds Rains 
Prudential Ltd, a case involving an application for legal aid that is bound 
itself to fall into obscurity. The statement is important because it evidences 
Lord Hoffmann's view of the conceptual basis and scope of the doctrine of 
fiscal nullity, which is found in his judgment in the latest House of Lords 
decision in Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments 
Ltd: ("Westmoreland"). 
The decision in Westmoreland and in particular Lord Hoffmann's 
powerful judgment, is likely to engender a significant amount of 
discussion in the corning months, even years. Cynical observers are likely 
to classify Westmoreland as just another swing of the pendulum in judicial 
attitudes towards tax avoidance that have influenced the development of 
the doctrine of fiscal nullity during the last twenty years. However, Lord 
Hoffmann's judgment represents more than an example of the courts' 
periodic change in attitude to tax avoidance schemes. It is the most 
comprehensive attempt to date to provide a conceptual framework for the 
1 Norglen Ltd v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd [1997] 3 WLR 1177,1186 (HL) Lord Hoffmann. 
2 Norglen Ltd v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd [1997] 3 WLR 1177,1186 (HL). 
3 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHLJ6 865 par 27 (HL). 
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operation of the doctrine of fiscal nullity that overcomes the criticisms of 
uncertainty and unconstitutionality which have belied its development. 
The most controversial aspect of Westmoreland is likely to be the 
apparent ease with which Lord Hoffmann reconciles the previous fiscal 
nullity cases with his approach.4 Lord Hoffmann 's view of the doctrine of 
fiscal nullity appears to be a significant change from Lord Brightman's 
formulation in Furniss v Dawson ( "Furniss").5 This paper focuses on 
interpreting Lord Hoffmann's judgment and attempts to reconcile it with 
the decisions in Furniss and IRC v McGuckian ("McGuckian").6 The 
conclusion is that while it may be possible to reconcile the decisions in 
Westmoreland and McGuckian (at least on their result), it is impossible to 
do the same in respect of Westmoreland and Furniss. The simple reason 
for this is that the approaches in Furniss and Westmoreland are 
fundamentally divergent. 
The starting and ending point of this exercise is the statement above. It 
is important to note that when citing himself in Westmoreland, Lord 
Hoffmann omits the last sentence of the quotation.7 An explanation of why 
the omission is significant is inappropriate at this point. It is instead 
reserved for the conclusion, along with a brief comment addressing the 
potential impact of Lord Hoffmann's judgment on the interpretation of 
section BG 1. 
4 John Tiley wryly observes that "The House was concerned to establish the legitimacy of the Ramsay approach, but this lay in its being one of statutory interpretation and application. This meant that Lord Hoffmann was simply explaining what judges had been doing for the last 20 years, whether or not those judges actually knew it. M. Jourdan 's surprise at discovering he had been speaking prose springs easily to mind." See John Tiley "First Thoughts on Westmoreland" [2001] 3 BTR 153, 154. 5 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474 (HL). 6 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991 (HL). 
7 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHU6 par 62 (Lord Hoffmann). 
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II BACKGROUND 
A The Problem 
While it is difficult to define exhaustively what constitutes tax avoidance,8 
it is even more challenging to draft effective legislation to prevent it. 
Attempts to draft provisions that are completely resistant to taxpayer abuse 
have generally been unsuccessful. There are several reasons: first, the 
practical need to restrict the volume of tax legislation, second, the ectopic 
nature of income tax law9 and third, the fact that tax legislation does not 
have only a revenue-raising function. 10 Two features of the United 
Kingdom tax system exacerbate this problem. The first characteristic, 
applicable to all laws, is "[the] English tendency to think of law as formal 
rules rather than principles, and to insist on judicial restraint, relying more 
on Parliament than on the courts as the dominant source of law." 11 This 
tendency finds its expression in a literal approach to statutory 
interpretation that focuses on the wording of particular statutory provisions 
and generally precludes the use of statutory purpose to interpret a statute, 
with some exceptions.12 The second feature is peculiar to the interpretation 
of tax statutes. It is alternately referred to as the Duke of Westminster 
8 It is generally agreed that tax avoidance arises where a taxpayer reduces a liability to tax without 
incurring the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by any taxpayer 
qualifying for such reduction in that liability. IRC v Willoughby [1997] STC 995, 1003-1004, cited in 
John Tiley Revenue Law (4ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 86. 
9 Income tax law is "ectopic" - that means, it is dislocated from its subject matter. This poses problems 
in combating tax avoidance. For an explanation of the ectopic nature of tax law and these problems, see 
John Prebble "Ectopia, Formalism and Anti - Avoidance Rules in Income Tax Law" in W Krawietz, N 
MacCormick and GH von Wright (eds) Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modem 
Legal Systems, Festschrift for Rohen S. Summers (Duncker and Humblot, Berlin, 1994) 367 - 383; 
John Prebble "Should Tax Legislation be Written from a Principles and Purpose Point of View or a 
Precise and Detailed Point of View?" [1998] 2 BTR 112. 
10 William Popkin lists the reasons for this approach. See William Popkin "Judicial Anti - Avoidance 
Doctrine in England: A United States Perspective" (1991) BTR 283, 285. 
11 William Popkin "Judicial Anti - Avoidance Doctrine in England: A United States Perspective" 
(1991) BTR 283, 283-285. 
12 There are three exceptions. The first is the "Golden Rule", which means that judges reject "absurd" 
literary meanings. In applying this Rule, judges will speculate about plausible legislative purposes. See 
F Bennion Statutory Interpretation (1984) 331-332. Second, judges recognise that the text may be 
unclear and that statutory purpose can be used to resolve doubts. Third, emphasis on the text is 
compatible with relying on the entire text rather than a few words. This expansive view of the relevant 
text calls attention to a type of statutory purpose, derived from the overall structure of the statutory test. 
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principle and the fonn over substance doctrine, and originates from Lord 
Tomlin's dictum in the House of Lords decision in IRC v Duke of 
Westminster: 13 
... it is said that in Revenue cases there is a doctrine that the Court may 
ignore the legal position and regard what is called the "substance of the 
matter" ... Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that 
the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is Jess than it otherwise 
would be. If he succeeds so as to secure this result, then, however 
unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow 
taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an 
increased tax. 
Lord Tomlin's statement has traditionally been cited as an authority for 
the proposition that in applying the relevant taxing statute to a transaction, 
the Court must consider the fonn, and not the substance, of the transaction. 
Therefore, "a transaction which, on its true construction, is of a kind that 
would escape tax is not taxable on the ground that the same result could 
have been brought about by a transaction in another form which would 
attract tax."14 
B The Development of the Doctrine of Fiscal Nullity15 
Various solutions to the problem of tax avoidance have been suggested.16 
An answer for some common law jurisdictions, such as New Zealand, has 
been to enact a general anti - avoidance rule. The United Kingdom has not 
yet enacted such a rule, although there is continuing debate about whether 
it should do so.17 Instead, initially in response to a proliferation of artificial 
13 IRC v Duke of Westminster [1936] AC 1, 19 (HL) Lord Tomlin. 
14 John Tiley Revenue ww (4ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford,2000) 19. 
15 This paper focuses on the key House of Lords decisions that it examines (Furniss, McGuckian and 
Westmoreland') and does not attempt an exhaustive exposition of the other fiscal nullity cases. For a 
good description of the development of the doctrine, see John Tiley Revenue Law ( 4ed, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2000) Ch 4. There are also numerous articles in the British Tax Review that deal 
with individual decisions. Some of these articles are listed in the bibliography to this paper. 
16 For a list of these solutions, see John Tiley Revenue Law (4ed, Hart Publishing, 2000, Oxford) 87-89. 
17 For example, see IFS Tax Law Review Committee (TLRC) Report on Avoidance (November 1). 
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tax avoidance schemes in the 1970s,18 the House of Lords has taken an 
active approach in striking down artificial tax avoidance schemes during 
the last twenty years by developing and applying a common law anti -
avoidance rule that has been termed the "doctrine of fiscal nullity." 
The birth of the doctrine of fiscal nullity, initially referred to as "the 
principle in Ramsay" and "the doctrine in Ramsay", occurred in WT 
Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commissioners ("Ramsay"). 19 The principle 
was subsequently expanded in Commrs of Inland Revenue v Burmah Oil 
Co20 and Furniss v Dawson ("Furniss"),21 where Lord Brightman laid 
down a formulation for the application of the doctrine. Although Lord 
Brightman's formulation was applied in subsequent cases, the conceptual 
basis and scope of the doctrine have remained controversial. Some of the 
reasons for this controversy were explored in the judgment of the majority 
of the House of Lords in Craven (HMIT) v White ("Craven v White"). 22 
Judgments in several of the recent fiscal nullity cases have purported to 
clarify its conceptual basis. In Craven v White, Lord Oliver, who delivered 
the leading judgment for the majority, described the doctrine as "a 
principle of statutory construction".23 In McGuckian, Lord Steyn and Lord 
Cooke referred to doctrine as "an example of the purposive approach to 
construction".24 Lord Hoffmann's judgment in Westmoreland supports 
Lord Cooke's view of the conceptual basis of the doctrine. 
18 WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300, 330 (HL) Lord Wilberforce, 339 Lord 
Russell, 340 Lord Roskill, 340 Lord Bridge. 
19 WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300, 332 (HL). 
2° Commrs of Inland Revenue v Burmah Oil [1982] TR 535 (HL). 
21 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474,486 (HL) Lord Brightman. 
22 Craven (HMIT) v White [1988] BTC 268, 285 (HL). 
23 Craven (HMIT) v White [1988] BTC 268,295 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
24 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991,1005 (HL) Lord Cooke, 998 Lord Steyn. 
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III RAMSAY, FURNISS V DAWSON AND McGUCKIAN 
Before embarking on an examination of Westmoreland and attempting to 
reconcile it with Furniss and McGuckian, it is appropriate to revisit these 
decisions. 
A Ramsay- the Fountainhead 
Ramsay involved a circular scheme, whose only purpose was the 
production of a tax advantage for the taxpayer. A number of transactions 
were executed in close succession. At the conclusion of the scheme, the 
taxpayer was in the same net financial position as he had been at the 
beginning, having established both an allowable capital loss and a tax 
exempt capital gain for the purposes of the legislation. The process is best 
described by Lord Wilberforce's atom metaphor:25 
In each case two assets appear, like "particles" in a gas chamber with 
opposite charges, one of which is used to create the loss, the other of 
which gives rise to an equivalent gain which prevents the taxpayer from 
supporting any real loss, and which gain is intended not to be taxable. 
Like the particles, these assets have a very short life. Having served 
their purpose they cancel each other out and disappear. 
The House of Lords held that the capital loss did not fall within the 
definition of "loss" in the legislation.26 As a result, the taxpayer was not 
allowed to offset the loss against the gain 
25 WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300, 324 (HL) Lord Wilberforce. 
26 WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300, 330 (HL) Lord Wilberforce, 339 Lord 
Russell, 340 Lord Roskill, 340 Lord Bridge. 
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1 Significance of the decision 
In his judgment, Lord Wilberforce listed several features of "schemes of 
this character"27 which one commentator describes as including the 
following: 28 
1) That the scheme is to be carried out with model documents 
according to a timetable, so that the only differences between what 
one taxpayer does and what another taxpayer does are the figures 
and timings put in the pre-drafted documents. 
2) That the scheme brings about no change in the financial position of 
the taxpayer, except that he pays a fee and expenses to the 
promoter. 
3) That there is, at the least, an overriding intention that the scheme is 
to be carried through to the end. 
4) That there is no "real money" involved in the transaction. 
5) That the "whole and only purpose" of the scheme was the 
avoidance of tax. 
The decision in Ramsay was the first successful attempt to strike down a 
wholly artificial tax scheme.29 Some commentators hailed the decision as 
signifying an end to all artificial retail tax avoidance schemes and 
perceived Lord Wilberforce's five features as a litmus test to be applied to 
all subsequent tax avoidance schemes.30 
This view is incorrect. Lord Wilberforce's list was simply a description 
of the typical scheme designed to avoid capital gains tax at that time ( of 
which the scheme in Ramsay was an example).31 Lord Wilberforce 
27 WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300,328 (HL) Lord Wilberforce. 
28 David Goldberg "Mete wands: How Gold and Straight?" (1982) BTR 233,234-235. 
29 Unsuccessful attempts were made in earlier cases; for example, in Floor v Davis (1980] AC 695(HL) 
and IRC v Plummer [1979] AC 896 (HL). 
30 For example, see David Goldberg "Mete wands: How Gold and Straight?" (1982) BTR 233. 
31 Peter Millett notes that due to the property boom in the early 1970s, large profits were made, which 
in turn gave rise to liability for capital gains tax. Schemes such as the one in Ramsay were designed to 
create an artificial loss to set off against the already crystallised liability. Such schemes usually had 
two attributes - first, they had to give rise to a substantial loss for capital gains tax purposes, and 
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examined the meaning of the word "loss" as used in the legislation and 
concluded that an actual economic loss was necessary in order for the 
provision to apply. 32 Given this interpretation, he held that that there was 
no loss in accordance with the statutory provision, construing each 
transaction in the context of the others. 33 
2 Form over substance, or substance over form? 
Some commentators argue that Lord Wilberforce's judgment "exploded" 
the Duke of Westminster principle, because he applied the statutory 
provision to the net effect of the arrangement, and therefore examined its 
substance, rather than its form.34 This view is inconsistent with Lord 
Wilberforce's express statements and his approach. Counsel for the 
taxpayer had argued that, in accordance with the Duke of Westminster 
principle, the legal effect of each step in the arrangement had to be 
separately examined for the purpose of applying the statutory provisions.35 
Lord Wilberforce rejected their reasoning on the grounds that:36 
If it can be seen that a document or transaction was intended to have 
effect as part of a nexus or series of transactions, or as an ingredient of a 
wider transaction intended as a whole, there is nothing in the doctrine to 
prevent it from being so regarded: to do so is not to prefer form to 
substance, or substance to form. It is the task of the court to ascertain 
the legal nature of any transaction to which it is sought to attach a tax or 
a tax consequence and if that emerges from a series or combination of 
transactions, intended to operate as such, it is that series or combination 
which may be regarded. 
second, the loss had to be an "unreal" loss in commercial terms. See Peter Millett "A New Approach to 
Tax Avoidance Schemes" (1982) 98 LQR 209, 211-213. 
32 "The capital gains tax .. .is a tax on gains . .. not a tax on arithmetical differences." WT Ramsay v 
Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300,326 (HL) Lord Wilberforce. 
33 WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300, 334 (HL) Lord Wilberforce. 
34 For example, see Peter Millett "A New Approach to Tax Avoidance Schemes" (1982) 98 LQR 
209,218. Millett argues that Lord Wilberforce accepted the Crown's contention that the individual 
transactions should be ignored and the only legal consequences are those that flowed from the series of 
transactions taken as an indivisible whole. See also H Monroe "Fiscal Finesse: Tax Avoidance and the 
Duke of Westminster" [1982] BTR 200. 
35 WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300, 323- 324 (HL). 
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Lord Wilberforce then stated that examining the steps of the 
arrangement as a whole did not involve looking at the "substance" of the 
arrangement, and thus breaching the Duke of Westminster principle.37 Did 
examining the effect of the composite scheme as a whole in fact involve 
looking at the substance, and not at the form, of the arrangement? It is 
misleading to suggest (as some have)38 that the statute was applied to the 
net effect of the arrangement by comparing the starting and ending result. 
All of the steps of the arrangement were given their full and independent 
legal effect. Lord Wilberforce simply construed each transaction in the 
context of the others in applying the legislation, and determined that:39 
The capital gains tax was created to operate in the real world, not that of 
make belief .. . To say that a loss (or gain) which appears to arise at one 
stage in an indivisible process, and which is intended to be and is 
cancelled out by a later stage, so that at the end of what was bought as, 
and planned as, a single continuous operation, there is not such a loss 
(or gain) as the legislation is dealing with, is in my opinion well and 
indeed essentially within the judicial function. 
It is a well accepted principle of income tax law that when applying the 
statutory provisions to an arrangement, the courts are entitled to have 
regard to transactions in their context. Lord Wilberforce's approach in 
Ramsay is also mirrored by his judgment in CIR v Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd,40 
where he applied section 111 of the Land and Income Tax Act 1954 to the 
net effect of an arrangement containing a series of preordained steps.41 
B Furniss v Dawson 
Unlike Ramsay, Furniss involved a linear transaction with enduring 
consequences and a clear commercial purpose. The taxpayer was 
potentially liable for capital gains tax on the sale of shares he owned in a 
36 WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300, 323- 324 (HL) Lord Wilberforce. 
37 WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300, 323-324 (HL) Lord Wilberforce. 
38 Peter Millett "A New Approach to Tax Avoidance Schemes" (1982) 98 LQR 209,218. 
39 WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300,326 (HL) Lord Wilberforce. 
40 CIR v Europa Oil (NZ) l..Jd [1971] NZLR 641 (PC). 
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private family company to another company - Wood Bastow Holdings Ltd 
("Wood Bastow"). To avoid paying capital gains tax, he entered into a 
scheme with two steps. First, he exchanged his shares for shares in a 
specially incorporated holding company - Greenjacket Investments Ltd 
("Greenjacket"). Then, Greenjacket sold the shares to Wood Bastow. The 
transaction prima facie fell under a rollover provision (Paragraph 6 of 
Schedule 7 of the Finance Act 1965) which made the disposal of shares by 
one company in return for shares in another company non - taxable where 
the second company acquired control of the first company. On the 
technical wording of the provision, the taxpayer had made a "disposal" of 
his shares to Greenjacket in exchange for shares from Greenjacket. Had 
the scheme been successful, the taxpayer would have deferred his tax 
liability until he sold the shares in Greenjacket. 
Lord Brightman delivered the leading judgment. He saw the principle 
developed in Ramsay as an "important new development."
42 Later courts 
as have accepted his formulation of the doctrine of fiscal nullity as the 
authoritative test for its application:43 
First, there must be a pre-ordained series of transactions; or, if one likes, 
one single composite transaction. This composite transaction may or 
may not include the achievement of a legitimate commercial ( i.e. 
business) end ... . Secondly, there must be steps inserted which have no 
commercial (business) purpose apart from the avoidance of a liability to 
tax - not "no business effect". If these two ingredients exist, the inserted 
steps are to be disregarded for fiscal purposes. The court must then look 
at the end result. Precisely how the end result will be taxed will depend 
on the terms of the taxing statute sought to be applied . .... 
The test requires the court to find as a fact that there is a pre-ordained 
series of transactions containing steps inserted without any commercial or 
business purpose apart from a tax advantage.
44 The steps inserted purely to 
41 CIR v Europa Oil (NZ) /Jd [1971] NZLR 641, 648 (PC) Lord Wilberforce. 
42 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474, 526 (HL) Lord Brightman. 
43 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474,527 (HL) Lord Brightman. 
44 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474, 527 (HL) Lord Brightman. 
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gain a tax advantage are ignored for the purpose of applying the statutory 
provision - in other words, they are treated as fiscally, a nullity. The "end 
result" is found by stripping the steps out of the transaction.45 The words 
of the statute are then interpreted and applied to the "end result" .46 
Lord Brightman applied the test, ignoring the transfer of shares to 
Greenjacket, which he held was motivated solely by tax considerations.47 
He found that the "end result" was a disposal by the taxpayer in favour of 
Wood Bastow (the ultimate purchaser).48 The statutory rollover provision 
clearly did not apply to the "end result". 
C IRC v McGuckian 
McGuckian involved a tax avoidance scheme which was clearly caught 
under the approach in Furniss. The two shareholders of a company, 
Ballinamore, wished to avoid paying tax on dividends paid by the 
company. To achieve this objective, they sold their shares in Ballinamore 
to Shurltrust, a trustee company. The taxpayers were the beneficiaries of 
the trust. Shurltrust then assigned to another company, Mallardchoice, the 
right to any dividends paid by Ballinamore in return for a consideration 
which mirrored the dividend eventually distributed by Ballinamore that 
year. The consideration was then paid to one of the original shareholders 
of Ballinamore in the shareholder's capacity as a beneficiary of the trust. 
The issue was whether the amount received by Shurltrust for the 
assignment of the right to dividends was "income" of a non - resident for 
the purposes of section 478 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 
1970. A payment received for the assignment of the right to receive 
dividends is usually treated as a capital receipt. 
The House of Lords held that the assignment of the dividend income to 
Mallardchoice could be disregarded. The majority of the Law Lords 
45 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474,527 (HL) Lord Brightman. 
46 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474,528 (HL) Lord Brightman. 
47 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474, 528 (HL) Lord Brightman. 
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applied the test in Furniss to reach that result.49 The true transaction was 
held to be the payment of a dividend by Ballinamore to its original 
shareholders, which fell within the definition of "income" in section 478.
50 
The decision is most significant for the comments made by Lord Steyn 
and Lord Cooke, who attempted to justify the doctrine of fiscal nullity by 
describing it as a doctrine of statutory construction. Lord Steyn noted 
that:51 
The principle was developed as a matter of statutory construction ... The 
new development was based on a linguistic analysis of the meaning of 
particular words in a statute. It was founded on a broad purposive 
interpretation, giving effect to the intention of Parliament. The principle 
enunciated in Ramsay was therefore based on an orthodox form of 
statutory interpretation ... 
Lord Cooke stated that, in his view, the basis of the doctrine lies in a 
purposive approach to statutory construction:52 
The principle which your Lordships have been developing .. .is not 
uncommonly seen as special to the construction of taxing Acts. Perhaps 
more helpfully, however, it may be recognised as an application to 
taxing Acts of the general approach to statutory interpretation whereby, 
in determining the natural meaning of particular expressions in their 
context, weight is given to the purpose and spirit of the legislation. 
48 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474, 527-528 (HL) Lord Brightman. 
49 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991,1002 (HL) Lord Steyn, 996-997 Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 
1006-1007 Lord Cooke. 
50 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991,1002 (HL) Lord Steyn, 996-997 Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 
1006-1007 Lord Cooke. 
51 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991, 1000 (HL) Lord Steyn. 
52 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991,1005 (HL) Lord Cooke. 
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III THE HOUSE OF LORDS JUDGMENT IN MACNIVEN V 
WESTMORELAND 
A The Facts 
Westmoreland involved a scheme entered into to set off a commercial loss. 
Westmoreland Investments Ltd ("WIL") was a property investment 
company owned by an approved superannuation scheme (the "scheme") 
which was exempt from income tax. In the 1970s, WIL made property 
investments financed by the scheme, which led to huge losses. After the 
final liquidation of its properties in 1988, WIL had no assets and a large 
indebtedness to the scheme, including $40 million in interest arrears. 
As a loss company, WIL had some potential value on disposal due to 
its accrued interest liability. Under section 338(1) of the Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act 1988, "charges on income", which include 
"payments of yearly interest" under section 338(3), may be set off against 
profits, and any unused excess may be carried forward. Crucially, under 
section 338, an interest debt only creates an allowable loss when it is 
actually paid. WIL entered into an arrangement to tum the interest arrears 
into an allowable loss. Under the arrangement (which was repeated several 
times), the scheme lent WIL money, which WIL used to immediately 
repay the interest, owed to the scheme. Tax was automatically deducted 
from the interest repayments. The trustees, as the trustees of a tax exempt 
superannuation scheme, reclaimed this tax from the Inland Revenue. 
The Crown argued that the loans and payments had a purely tax 
avoidance purpose and should therefore be disregarded. Therefore, they 
did not fall within the term "payments of yearly interest" in section 338(3) 
and did not constitute "charges on income" under section 338(1).53 The 
53 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHU6 865 par 27 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
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Crown also sought to rely upon several specific anti - avoidance 
provisions. 54 
B The Court of Appeal Judgment 
The Court of Appeal held that the tax consequences of the arrangement 
were those argued for by the taxpayers. Peter Gibson L.J, who delivered the 
leading judgment, concluded that the arrangement was also motivated by a 
commercial objective because WIL achieved refinancing on more 
favourable terms. The fact that it could have been achieved by the terms of 
the existing loan did not mean it should be ignored.55 He held that the 
parties were entitled to adopt whichever course of action was more 
advantageous to them, although a tax consideration also influenced their 
choice.56 The fact that the scheme was able to reclaim the tax paid on the 
interest was irrelevant, given that was the advantage Parliament intended 
such schemes to have.57 
C The House of Lords Judgment 
The House of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal. Lord 
Hoffmann delivered the leading judgment containing the most detailed 
discussion of the doctrine of fiscal nullity. The most obvious principle that 
emerges from Lord Hoffmann's decision is the distinction between the 
interpretation of legislative provisions based on economic concepts and 
those based on juristic concepts (the "legal/commercial concept 
distinction"). It forms part of a new formulation for analysing tax 
avoidance arrangements to determine whether they are caught by the fiscal 
nullity doctrine. 
54 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHLJ6 865 par 70 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
55 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHU6 865 par 65 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
56 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHI.J6 865 par 65 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
57 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHI.J6 865 par 65 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
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The new test is applied in the following manner. First, the statutory 
provision which results in a tax advantage on the face of the arrangement 
is analysed. If the court finds that the provision refers to a legal (or 
"juristic") concept and the arrangement falls within the legal definition, the 
arrangement is not invalidated under the doctrine even if it has no business 
(or commercial) purpose.58 If it is held that the provision refers to a 
business or economic concept, the court examines the "business 
substance" of the arrangement in order to determine whether it comes 
within the statutory language. At this point, closely linked parts of a 
transaction can be aggregated.59 An arrangement whose "business 
substance" falls within the statutory language cannot be disregarded 
simply on the ground that it was entered into solely for tax reasons.60 The 
distinction was applied to the facts in the following way:61 
1) that construing the relevant legislation in its context, the question to 
be decided was whether there bad been a payment; 2) that in the present 
context one bad to distinguish terms which should be construed 
juristically from those which should be interpreted commercially; 3) 
that the term payment was to be construed juristically as opposed to 
commercially and 4) in this case the juristic meaning was that there was 
a payment if the legal obligation to pay interest bad been discharged. 
58 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHIJ6 865 par 58 (1-Il.,) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
59 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHL/6 865 par 34/35/59 
(1-Il.,) Lord Hoffmann. 
60 
The example Lord Hoffmann uses is that where a transaction produces capital in ordinary 
commercial sense of the word and bas been structured to do so, it cannot be recbaracterised. See 
Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHIJ6 865 par 59/60 (1-Il.,) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
61 John Tiley "First Thoughts on Westmoreland'' [2001] 3 BTR 153, 154. 
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IV WHAT WAS LORD HOFFMANN REALLY TRYING TO SAY? 
A The Crudity of the Legal/Commercial Concept Distinction 
The most problematic aspect of Lord Hoffmann's approach is that the 
legal/commercial concept distinction seems very simplistic. This gives rise 
to a danger that later courts may apply the formulation literally. A blind 
application of the distinction could give rise to numerous problems.62 The 
most significant problem is the potential for greater uncertainty. One 
commentator has noted that there will be a "prolonged period of 
uncertainty" as judges decide which statutory provisions are to be 
construed with reference to business concepts, and which statutory 
provisions are to be construed with reference to commercial concepts.63 
This argument is supported by the very nature of income tax legislation. 
Given that income tax law is ectopic a simple distinction between purely 
legal and purely commercial concepts may be difficult to draw. Thomas J 
also makes this criticism in his decision in C of IR v BNZ Investments Ltd 
("BNZI"), 64 noting that even income, the most fundamental concept in tax 
legislation, could be said to be imposed by reference to a legal concept or a 
commercial concept.65 The fact that much income tax legislation is now 
detailed and complex exacerbates this problem. This means that there may 
not be room for anything but a juristic approach to its interpretation. 
B A Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation 
The answer is that in applying the distinction, Lord Hoffmann is merely 
reasoning by labels. What, then, is the real principle behind the decision? 
62 John Tiley outlines some of those problems in John Tiley "First Thoughts on Westmoreland"[200l] 3 
BTR 153, 155-157. 
63 John Tiley "First Thoughts on Westmoreland" [2001] 3 BTR 153, 156. 64 C of IR v BNZ Investments LJd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103 (CA). 
65 C of IR v BNZ Investments LJd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103, par 109 (CA) Thomas J. 
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1 Lord Hojfma,nn 's approach 
The starting point is to acknowledge that Lord Hoffmann's judgment is an 
attempt to justify the existence of the doctrine of fiscal nullity in terms of 
an existing legal and conceptual framework. Hence, as he embarks on his 
reasoning, Lord Hoffmann asserts that "everyone agrees that the Ramsay 
case is a principle of construction."66 Who "everyone" is, and whether 
everyone shares Lord Hoffmann 's view of the conceptual basis of the 
doctrine, is uncertain.67 In the concluding sentence of the first paragraph of 
his reasoning, Lord Hoffmann (while dismissing the wide argument put 
forward for the Commissioner) emphasizes that "the courts have no 
constitutional authority to impose such an overlay upon the tax legislation 
and, as I hope to demonstrate, they have not attempted to do so. "68 The 
remainder of his judgment focuses on demonstrating that the doctrine of 
fiscal nullity is a principle of statutory construction. 
The use of the commercial/legal concept distinction, combined with 
Lord Hoffmann's express approval of the statements made by Lord Steyn 
and Lord Cooke in McGuckian,69 point towards the conclusion that he 
views the doctrine of fiscal nullity as an example of a rule - based 
approach to statutory interpretation, that relies primarily on the text. 
According to this approach, a provision that refers to a tax concept 
signifies that Parliament must have intended for taxpayers that fall within 
the literal words of the provision to be able to take advantage of it. This 
conclusion is also supported by Lord Hoffmann's statement in Norglen and 
his comment that the limitations of the doctrine of fiscal nullity "arise out 
of the paramount necessity of giving effect to the statutory language."70 He 
66 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHIJ6 865 par 28 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
67 As will be proved later, "everyone" does not include the House of Lords in Furniss . 68 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UIUIL/6 865 par 29 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
69 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHIJ6 865 par 51-59 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
70 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHIJ6 865 par 58 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
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expressly rejects the view that a tax avoidance purpose is relevant in 
construing the tax statute, stating that:71 
Even if a statutory expression refers to a business or economic concept, 
one cannot disregard a transaction which comes within the statutory 
language, construed in the correct commercial sense, simply on the ground 
that it was entered into solely for tax reasons ... Likewise the use of 
business concepts like "income" and "capital" may give the taxpayer a 
choice of structuring a commercial transaction so as to come within one 
concept or the other. .. It follows that a transaction which, for the avoidance 
of tax, has been structured to produce, say, capital, and does produce 
capital in the ordinary commercial sense of that concept (unlike the 
payment in !RC v McGuckian) cannot be 'recharacterised' as producing 
income. 
There is a move towards a rules - based purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation in law generally.72 Lord Hoffmann's approach in 
Westmoreland reflects his view that tax law should not be interpreted 
differently from any other laws. 
2 Support in the other House of Lords judgments 
Support for Lord Hoffmann's narrow, rules - based approach can be found 
in the speeches of some of the other Law Lords in Westmoreland. Lord 
Nicholls agrees with the comments of Lord Steyn in McGuckian that the 
doctrine of fiscal nullity "is an exemplification of the established 
7 1 
Macniven (inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHLJ6 865 par 59-61 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
72 
Lord Hoffmann's judgments in contract law cases exemplify the same approach to interpretation. 
For example, see Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313 (HL). 
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purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes".73 He also expressly 
endorses Lord Wilberforce's view in Ramsay that: 74 
The need to consider a document or transaction in its proper context, 
and the need to adopt a purposive approach when construing taxation 
legislation, are principles of general application. 
The only difference between the approaches of Lord Nicholls and Lord 
Hoffmann in arises in the tests they apply. Lord Nicholls' test focuses on 
determining the legal nature of the transaction before interpreting the 
statutory language and applying it to the facts.75 Although Lord Nicholls' 
formulation seems more logical, both approaches ought to lead to the same 
results in a particular case, given Lord Hoffmann's statement that if a 
statutory provision refers to a business concept, the court is entitled to 
apply the provision to the composite transaction as a whole. 
3 Is this what Lord Wilberforce intended in Ramsay? 
Is Lord Wilberforce's judgment in Ramsay also an application of the 
purposive approach to interpreting tax legislation? In Lord Hoffmann's 
view, it clearly is:76 
The innovation in the Ramsay case was to give the statutory concepts of 
"disposal" and "loss" a commercial meaning. The new principle of 
construction was a recognition that the statutory language was intended to 
refer to commercial concepts, so that in the case of a concept such as a 
'disposal', the court was required to take a view of the facts which 
transcended the juristic individuality of the various parts of a series of 
preplanned transactions. 
73 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKH1)6 865 par 6 (HL) 
Lord Nicholls. 
74 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHIJ6 865 par 8 (HL) 
Lord Nicholls. 
75 This approach makes more sense than Lord Hoffrnann's "cart before the horse" approach. 76 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHIJ6 865 par 32 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
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This view is consistent with Lord Wilberforce's decision. As noted in 
Part III, he examined the meaning of the word "loss" as used in the 
legislation and concluded that an actual economic loss was necessary in 
order for the provision to apply.77 He held that a loss that fell within the 
terms of the legislation had not occurred, because, looking at the step in 
the arrangement that gave rise to the loss in the context of the other 
arrangements, the loss that occurred was offset by an equivalent gain by a 
later step in the arrangement.78 He also rejected the argument of counsel 
for the taxpayer, who had argued that striking down the scheme would be 
tantamount to the creation of a judicial anti - avoidance principle, stating 
that his approach: 79 
... does not introduce a new principle: it would be to apply to new and 
sophisticated devices the undoubted power and duty of the courts to 
detennine their nature in law and to relate them to existing legislation. 
Coupled with his comments about the interpretation of what constitutes 
a "loss" for the purposes of capital gains tax, Lord Wilberforce's statement 
strongly suggests that his judgment was an application of the purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation. 
V FORM OVER SUBSTANCE LORD HOFFMANN'S 
APPROACH 
A The Duke of Westminster Principle Survives 
Lord Hoffmann attempts to reconcile his formulation of the doctrine of 
fiscal nullity with the Duke of Westminster principle. According to his test, 
77 "The capital gains tax .. .is a tax on gains ... not a tax on arithmetical differences." WT Ramsay v 
Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300,326 (HL) Lord Wilberforce. 
78 WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300,326 (HL) Lord Wilberforce. 
19 WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commrs [1982] AC 300, 327 (HL) Lord Wilberforce. 
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the "legal position" varies in accordance with the statutory concept that is 
applied. Hence:80 
. .. if the legal position is that tax is imposed by reference to a 
commercial concept, then to have regard to the business "substance" of 
the matter is not to ignore the legal position but to give effect to it. 
Does this approach limit the application of the Duke of Westminster 
principle? The answer depends on how the Duke of Westminster principle 
is defined. Lord Hoffmann argues that it is impossible to view form and 
substance as abstract concepts, and to distinguish them without using a 
point of reference. Hence, "something may be real for one purpose but not 
for another". 81 The appropriate point of reference for distinguishing 
between form and substance in tax cases (in the absence of a general anti -
avoidance provision) is the statutory provision sought to be applied. If the 
statutory provision refers to a business concept, then it is appropriate to 
examine the "business substance" of the transaction. 
Lord Hoffmann's approach is not inconsistent with the Duke of 
Westminster principle, because the principle stands for the proposition that 
the taxpayer must be taxed by reference to what he or she has actually 
done - in other words, by the legal results of the transaction entered into by 
the taxpayer.82 Examining the business substance of a transaction is not 
synonymous with ignoring what the taxpayer has done. It is only a means 
of determining whether what the taxpayer has done falls within the 
statutory provision at issue, if the provision is based on a commercial 
concept.83 Put more simply, the distinction between form and substance is 
80 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHU6 865 par 39 (fil) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
81 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHU6 865 par 40 (fil) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
82 This is, for example, how John Tiley defines the Duke of Westminster principle. See John Tiley 
Revenue Law (4ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 93. 
83 And Lord Hoffmann expressly confirms this, stating that "If the 'legal position' is that the tax is 
imposed by reference to a legally defined concept, such as stamp duty payable on a document which 
constitutes a conveyance on sale, the court cannot tax a transaction which uses no such document on 
the ground that it achieves the same economic effect". See Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v 
Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHU6 865 par 39 (fil) Lord Hoffmann. 
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a conclusion arising from the interpretation of the statutory provision at 
issue, not a test in itself. 
Lord Hoffmann's attempt to resolve the form/substance debate in a 
logical manner is very similar to Joseph Isenbergh's view of the issue, 
which is contained in an article criticising the substance over form 
approach employed by the United States courts in examining tax 
avoidance arrangements.84 In Isenbergh's view:85 
The most important inquiry at the threshold is whether a statutory 
provision draws its meaning from the terms of the statute itself or (and 
to what extent) from outside. When we are dealing with statutory terms 
of art, the fonn/substance dichotomy is a false one. "Substance" can 
only be derived from forms created by the statute itself. Here substance 
is form and little else ... The harder problem is measuring transactions 
against statutory provisions that draw their content from life. The 
ultimate question here is what it is that taxpayers have actually done. 
This is a difficult sort of inquiry, which requires a grasp of 
transactions in their complete setting. 
The distinction that Isenbergh makes between statutory terms of art and 
statutory provisions that draw their content from life mirrors Lord 
Hoffmann's distinction between juristic concepts and business concepts. 
The last sentence of the above quotation encapsulates Lord Wilberforce's 
approach in examining the composite transaction in Ramsay to ascertain 
whether a "loss" had occurred within the meaning of the capital gains tax 
legislation. 
84 Joseph Isenbergh "Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation" (1982) U Chi Law Rev 859. 
85 Joseph Isenbergh "Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation" (1982) U Chi Law Rev 859, 879. 
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B Can the Business Substance of a Transaction Differ from its 
"True Substance"? 
Thomas J questions Lord Hoffmann's use of the notion of business 
substance in his judgment in BNZI, noting that it may differ from the "true 
substance of a transaction" .86 He states that: 87 
. . . the implication is that there may be a business substance to a 
transaction which may not reflect the tax avoidance effect of that 
transaction. 
Thomas J's criticism is not entirely justified. The true substance of a 
transaction may differ according to the statutory provision by reference to 
which a transaction is examined and whether the transaction is "real" for 
the purposes of that provision. When Thomas J talks about the true 
substance of the transaction, his point of reference is unclear. If he is 
examining the true substance of a transaction with reference to the intent 
of the particular statutory provision, then the business substance of the 
transaction must necessarily equate with its true substance. This is 
because, pursuant to Lord Hoffmann's reasoning, if a provision does allow 
the taxpayer to manipulate it to his advantage, that is because Parliament 
intended that this should be the case. However, if Thomas J is referring to 
the true substance of the transaction intending to assess it against some 
wider, underlying fundamental principle of the income tax legislation in 
question, the business substance of the transaction may well not equate 
with its true substance. 
Lord Hoffmann's explanation of the Duke of Wetminster principle as it 
applies to the doctrine of fiscal nullity is supported by the very nature of 
the doctrine of fiscal nullity as a common law anti - avoidance rule. The 
doctrine in not an express statutory anti - avoidance provision and must 
therefore be firmly based on statutory interpretation in order to be 
86C of IR v BNZ Investments L1d (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103 (CA) par 111 Thomas J. 
87C of IR v BNZ Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103 (CA) par 111 Thomas J. 
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conceptually sound. Looking at what Thomas J describes as the true 
substance of the transaction and asking if Parliament intended such 
particular transactions to be covered, involves looking for a deeper 
purpose in the income tax legislation and is only a legitimate exercise if 
this purpose is found in a statutory anti - avoidance provision. 
Thomas J's comment that the business substance of a transaction may 
differ from its tax avoidance effect is therefore correct. This is an 
inescapable conclusion given the conceptual foundation of the doctrine of 
fiscal nullity and the absence of a statutory general anti - avoidance 
provision. 
VI RECONCILING FURNISS AND WESTMORELAND 
A Lord Hoffmann's Attempt 
On the surface, Lord Hoffmann 's approach is a cardinal change from Lord 
Brightman's formulation in Furniss. Lord Hoffmann's test involves 
determining how the relevant statutory provision is to be constructed, and 
then applying it to the arrangement. In contrast, under the test in Furniss, 
the arrangement is first recharacterised by removing steps motivated solely 
by a tax avoidance purpose before the statutory provision is interpreted 
and applied. 
Yet, Lord Hoffmann reconciles the two approaches in his decision in 
Westmoreland. He states that the decision in Furniss was merely an 
application of commercial/legal concept distinction
88 and describes Lord 
Brightman's formulation in Furniss as "a statement of the consequences of 
giving a commercial construction to a fiscal concept. "
89 He notes that "if 
the statutory language is construed as referring to a commercial concept, 
then it follows that steps which have no commercial purpose but which 
88 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd (2001] UKHIJ6 865 par 48 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
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have been artificially inserted for tax purposes into a composite transaction 
will not affect the answer to the statutory question."90 Hence, in Furniss, 
the House of Lords had decided that the "relevant concept" was a 
commercial concept. While the question in Ramsay had been whether 
there was a disposal giving rise to a loss, the issue in Furniss was whether 
the disposal had been to one person rather than another. Greenjacket was 
an artificially introduced intermediate party, which was never intended to 
own the shares permanently. Commercially, therefore, the transaction was 
a transfer by the Dawsons to Wood Bastow in exchange for a payment to 
Greenjacket.91 
B Is Lord Hoffmann's interpretation correct? 
This and the next Part conclude that Lord Hoffmann's interpretation is 
incorrect. The alternative formulations of the doctrine of fiscal nullity in 
Westmoreland and Furniss cannot be reconciled, because they are based 
on fundamentally different approaches of the conceptual foundation and 
role of the doctrine. Contrary to Lord Hoffmann's view, the result in 
Furniss is also inconsistent with his approach to the conceptual foundation 
and scope of the doctrine of fiscal nullity. 
C Is the result in Furniss actually consistent with Lord Hoffmann's 
formulation? 
The Law Lords in Furniss unanimously interpret the arrangement as 
involving a tripartite contract involving a disposal by the taxpayers of the 
shares to Wood Bastow in consideration of a sum of money paid to 
Greenjacket with the concurrence of the taxpayers.92 This is clearly a 
89 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHU6 865 par 49 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
90 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHU6 865 par 48 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
91 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHIJ6 865 par 46 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
92 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474,478 (HL) Lord Fraser,495 Lord Scarman, 516 Lord 
Roskill, 523 Lord Bridge of Harwich, 528 Lord Brightman. 
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recharacterisation of the transaction
93 because it ignores what the 
taxpayers actually did, and ignores its enduring legal consequences. 
Is the recharacterisation consistent with Lord Hoffmann 's formulation of 
the doctrine of fiscal nullity? The two formulations would probably lead to 
different results on the facts of Furniss. In Furniss, the House of Lords 
held that there had been no "disposal" of the shares by the taxpayers to 
Greenjacket. However, this result cannot be reached without 
recharacterising the transaction as the House of Lords did in Furniss, 
because the taxpayers clearly did dispose of the shares to Greenjacket, at 
least according to the ordinary meaning of the word "disposal", which 
connotes passing the legal title to property to another person. It is difficult 
to envisage a commercial concept of disposal that is different from its 
ordinary meaning. Lord Nicholls' comment in Westmoreland that the 
meaning of "payment" cannot vary according to the purpose for which the 
payment is made could aptly be described as determining what constitutes 
a "disposal" .94 
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that Lord Hoffmann wrongly 
identified the issue in Furniss as being whether the disposal of shares was 
in favour of Wood Bastow and not in favour of Greenjacket.
95 As John 
Tiley notes, this is the correct issue if the test in Furniss is used to analyse 
the arrangement. However, if Lord Hoffmann 's test was applied, there is 
clearly a disposal within the terms of the statute. The true issue would be 
whether the share exchange ever came within the relevant statutory 
provision - Paragraph 6 of Schedule 7 of the Finance Act 1965.
96 
Paragraph 6 provides exceptions from the general liability to tax in respect 
of capital gains accruing to a person on the disposal of assets which arises 
93 See, for example, Hugh Appleton "The Interaction between Paragraph 13 and McGuckian: A 
Descent into the Maelstrom" [1999] BTR 86; Richard Green "Tax Avoidance: Where is the Pendulum 
Now?" in Conference Papers -The 1999 Tax Conference 10. 
94 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHIJ6 865 par 14 (HL) 
Lord Nicholls. 
95 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHIJ6 865 par 46 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
96 John Tiley "First Thoughts on Westmoreland" [2001] 3 BTR 153, 156. 
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out of section 19 of the Finance Act 1965. The relevant exception applies 
to the transfer of shares in a company to another company, which thereby 
acquires control of the shares of the transferor, in exchange for shares in 
the transferee company. Pursuant to Lord Hoffmann's test in Macniven, the 
real issue may be whether Greenjacket ever acquired control of the shares 
in the private holding company. The answer would depend on the 
construction of the term "control" as it is used in the statutory provision, 
more exactly, whether it refers to a commercial concept or to a legal 
concept. Given that the Dawsons, who controlled the private holding 
company, also had total control over Greenjacket throughout, Greenjacket 
may never have acquired "control" within the meaning of the provision if 
the term "control" was held to refer to a commercial concept. A final 
answer to the question whether the arrangement falls within the statutory 
exception would also hinge on the interpretation of other terms in 
provision providing the statutory exception. 
D Furniss is based on a lack of business purpose 
The concept of "disposal" does not possess a commercial meaning over 
and above its ordinary, everyday meaning. Why, then, did Lord Brightman 
in Furniss hold that there had been no "disposal" by the taxpayers to 
Greenjacket within the meaning of the relevant statutory provision? The 
answer is simple: he applied the formulation that he propounded in 
Furniss. This formulation, according to Lord Hoffmann, is "a statement of 
the consequences of giving a commercial construction to a fiscal 
concept."97 Lord Hoffmann's statement is clearly incorrect because it is 
based on the incorrect assumption that "disposal" is a commercial concept. 
The conclusion of the House of Lords in Furniss that the taxpayers did 
not dispose of their shares to Greenjacket was based on the fact that the 
disposal to Greenjacket had no commercial purpose other than the 
97 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHIJ6 865 par 49 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
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avoidance of tax. Hence, it was disregarded and the statute was applied to 
the "end result." Alternatively, as Peter Millett argues:
98 
It is a convenient, but potentially misleading, use of language to say that 
in Furniss v Dawson the House of Lords "disregarded" the first step in 
the transaction, i.e. the disposal to Greenjacket. They did not 
"disregard" it in the sense of treating it as if it never happened. They 
"disregarded" it because it was not the relevant transaction. The true 
analysis was that the taxpayer disposed of his shares to the ultimate 
purchasers, but by two steps instead of one; that the first step was not 
the relevant transaction but only part of it; that it had no commercial 
purpose; and accordingly did not come within the relevant statutory 
provision. 
According to Millett's analysis, the House of Lords approach in Furniss 
can be justified as an approach to statutory construction which 
incorporates an implied requirement in the statutory provision at issue that 
in order come within its purview, a "disposal" must have some business 
purpose other than a tax avoidance purpose. Lord Brightman's formulation 
imbues every statutory provision with an implied business purpose 
requirement. 
In order to really understand the conceptual basis of Lord Brightman's 
formulation, it is necessary to take a "world tour" through some of the 
common law doctrines that the United States courts have developed to 
combat tax avoidance. The next Part provides a brief overview of these 
doctrines and concludes that Lord Brightman's formulation in Furniss is a 
combination of several of these approaches. 
98 Peter Millett "Artificial Tax Avoidance: The English and American Approach" (1987) BTR 327, 
338. 
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V THE BASIS OF FURNISS: AN AMALGAMATION OF 
UNITED STATES DOCTRINES 
A Purposive Approach to Statutory Construction 
The United States courts employ a broad purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation and are far more willing than English courts to speculate 
about statutory purpose to interpret a statute, without lingering too much 
on the constraints apparently imposed by the text. The marked difference 
between the British and United States courts' approach to statutory 
interpretation is due to a number of factors. 99 One reason for the 
divergence is that the United States Constitution forces courts to identify a 
statute's purpose.100 In practice, the courts seldom refuse to consider 
extrinsic aids, regardless of whether the statutory language is plain or 
ambiguous. 101 There are no formal restrictions on the material that may be 
taken into account in interpreting the statutory language. 102 This approach 
is sometimes characterized by the maxim "Look at the Code only if the 
committee reports are unambiguous."103 
B Gregory v Helvering 
The starting point of the United States courts' attitude to tax avoidance is 
Learned Hand J's judgment in the New York Court of Appeals in Gregory 
v Helvering, 104 ("Gregory") which was delivered in the same year as the 
House of Lords decision in Duke of Westminster. Gregory involved a 
transaction very similar to the arrangement in Furniss. The taxpayer 
99 For a brief description of the differences that have led to the divergent approaches, see William 
Popkin" Judicial Anti - Avoidance Doctrine in England: A United States Perspective" (1991) BTR 
283, 284-286. 
'
00 P Atiyah and Robert Summers Form and Substance in Anglo- American Law: A Comparative Study 
of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal Institutions (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987) 75-
76, 99. 
101 Boris Bittker Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, Boston, 
1981). 
102 Boris Bittker Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, Boston, 
1981) 4-24. 
103 Boris Bittker Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, Boston, 
1981) 4-22. 
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owned shares, held by a wholly owned company, that had appreciated in 
value. If the taxpayer had simply disposed of the shares and realised a 
gain, she would have been liable to pay capital gains tax. In order to avoid 
paying tax, the taxpayer implemented a simple scheme. She formed 
another wholly owned company. The first company transferred some of its 
shares to the second company in return for shares in the second company. 
The second company then immediately sold the shares at their market 
value and thus realised the gain. The issue was whether the first step of the 
arrangement (the share exchange between the first and second company) 
was within the statutory exemption. Taken literally, the taxpayer's 
transaction was a tax-free corporate reorganization. The trial court held 
that "a statute so meticulously drafted must be interpreted as a literal 
expression of the taxing policy", and the second corporation was entitled 
to recognition, despite its transitory life as a vehicle to transfer the 
securities from the first corporation to its sole shareholder.105 
The Court of Appeals held that the transaction did not qualify as a 
"reorganization" when the purpose of the statutory definition of that term 
was taken into account. Judge Learned Hand (as he then was) stated 
that:106 
The purpose of the section is plain enough; men engaged in enterprises -
industrial, commercial, financial, or any other - might wish to 
consolidate, or divide, to add to, or subtract from, their holdings. Such 
transactions were not to be considered as "realizing" any profit, because 
the collective interests still remained in solution. But the underlying 
presupposition is plain that the readjustment shall be undertaken for 
reasons germane to the conduct of the venture in hand, not as an 
ephemereal incident, egregious to its prosecution. To dodge the 
shareholders' taxes is not one of the transactions contemplated as 
corporate "reorganizations." 
104 Gregory v Helvering (1935) 293 US 465. 
105 Gregory v CIR (1932) 27 BTA 223,225. 
106 Helvering v Gregory (1934) 69 F 2d 809, 811 (2d Circ) Judge Learned Hand. 
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The Supreme Court expressly endorsed this reasoning. 107 Gregory can 
be seen as a case that turned on a wide, purposive approach to the 
interpretation of the term "reorganization" .108 However, the language in 
Gregory has received a broader interpretation: it has spawned three 
doctrines that enable the courts to strike down tax avoidance 
arrangements.109 The doctrines have at times been described as uncertain 
and illogical.110 There are conflicting views about whether they should be 
introduced into United Kingdom law. 111 The analysis of the doctrines 
below is substantially taken from Bittker's tax law commentary. 112 
C The United States Anti - Avoidance Doctrines 
1 The doctrine of form over substance 
Learned Hand J once famously described the doctrine of substance over 
form as an anodyne for the pains of reasoning.113 The substance-over-
form principle has, however, also been called "the cornerstone of sound 
taxation." 114 The crux of the principle is that in deciding federal tax cases, 
the courts are usually willing to take account of the substance behind the 
form. 115 Bittker notes that "unfortunately, it is almost impossible to distil 
107 Gregory v Helvering (1935) 293 US 465,473. 
108 According to Joseph Isenbergh, this is questionable because "reorganisation" is a legal, not a 
commercial, concept. See Joseph Isenbergh "Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation" (1982) U 
Chi Law Rev 859, 868. 
109 It is often cited in support of the business purpose and substance-over-form doctrines, but could be 
equally viewed as a step transaction case. Boris Bittker Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 
(Warren, Gorham and Lamont, Boston, 1981) 4-22, 4-51 - 4-52. 
110 See Joseph Isenbergh "Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation" (1982) U Chi Law Rev 859, 
John Tiley "Judicial Anti - Avoidance Doctrines: The US Alternatives" (1987) BTR 180. 
111 John Tiley is against their introduction into UK law, "since both the intellectual structure of the 
United States tax system and the administrative structure that underpins it are very different from ours." 
See John Tiley "Judicial Anti - Avoidance Doctrines: The US Alternatives" (1987) BTR 180, 180. 
Peter Millett, on the other hand, describes the approach of the US courts as "perfectly respectable." See 
Peter Millett "Artificial Tax Avoidance: the English and American Approach" (1987) BTR 327,328. 
112 Boris Bittker Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, Boston, 
1981). 
113 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Sansome (1932) 60 F 2d 931,933 (2d Cir). 
114 Weinert 's Estate v CIR (1961) 294 F 2d 750,755 (5th Circ). 
115 Boris Bittker Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, Boston, 
1981) 4-36. 
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useful generalizations from the welter of substance-over-form cases."
116 
An example of a decision based on the form over substance approach is 
Knetsch v United States,117 where the Supreme Court held that a 
transaction (the purchase of ten 30- year deferred annuity savings bonds, 
financed by a down payment and funds borrowed from the issuer against 
their cash surrender value) was a "sham", devoid of economic results, 
because "there was nothing in substance to be realized beyond a tax 
deduction."118 Eisenberg's criticisms of a wide doctrine of form over 
substance and Lord Hoffmann 's approval of these criticisms, were noted 
earlier. 119 
2 The Business Purpose Doctrine 
The business purpose doctrine originated in Gregory. Subsequent to 
Gregory, it proliferated as an implied requirement of other statutory 
provisions120 and became an independent canon of construction reflecting 
the view that: 121 
Tax cases can't be solved by an abstract, intellectual analysis of the 
language used in the statute, divorced from practical 
considerations ... Tax is imposed, and exemptions from tax are granted 
by Congress in respect of commercial or financial transactions. The 
words of a taxing statute are therefore to be taken to refer only to 
transactions entered into for some commercial or financial purpose. 
Under the doctrine, in certain circumstances the benefit of a business tax 
rule will be withheld if the taxpayer is unable to establish a business 
purpose for the transaction which, he claims, brings him within the rule. 
This can be widened to include the exclusion of any tax rule on the ground 
11 6 Boris Bittker Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, Boston, 
1981) 4-37. 
117 Knetsch v United States (1960) 364 US 361. 
11 8 Knetsch v United States (1960) 364 US 361, 366. 
11 9 See Part VA ofthis paper. 
120 Boris Bittker Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, Boston, 
1981) 4-45 . 
12 1 Peter Millett "Artificial Tax Avoidance - The English and American Approach" (1987) BTR 327, 
331. 
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that there is no purpose to the transaction other than the attempt to save 
tax provided the facts show no alteration to the beneficial interests on the 
taxpayer. 122 This formulation is usually credited to Knetsch v US. The 
Supreme Court in Gregory expressly rejected the idea that a tax advantage 
can be withheld solely because of the absence of a non - tax motive.123 
Bittker notes that Knetsch v US comes close to saying in general terms that 
the absence of a non - tax motive may disentitle the taxpayer from a tax 
advantage.124 
3 The step transaction doctrine 
The step transaction doctrine requires the interrelated steps of an integrated 
transaction to be taken as a whole rather than treated separately. 125 A series 
of formally separate steps may be amalgamated and treated as a single 
transaction if they are in substance integrated, interdependent, and focused 
on a particular end result. 126 There exists authority for linking several 
prearranged or contemplated steps, even in the absence of a contractual 
obligation or financial compulsion to follow them through. 127 
Step transaction cases are usually concerned with whether a particular 
step with significant legal or business consequences should be treated as 
part of a larger single transaction. There are also cases in which particular 
steps in an integrated transaction are disregarded as transitory events, and 
122 Boris Binker Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, Boston, 
1981) 4-46. 
123 "The rule which excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the 
situation, because the transaction on its face lies outside the plain intent of the statute." Gregory v 
Helvering (1935) 293 US 465,470. 
124 Boris Binker Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, Boston, 
1981) 4-46. 
125 Boris Binker Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, Boston, 
1981) 4-47. 
126 The test for applying the doctrine is "were the steps taken so interdependent that the legal relations 
created by one transaction would have been frujtless without a completion of the series?" Manhanan 
Building Co v CIR (1957) 27 TC 1032, 1042, citing American Bantam Car Co v CIR (1948) 11 TC 
397, affirmed per curiam, (1949) 177 F 2d 513 (3d Cir). 
127 King Enterprises, Inc v US (1969) 418 F 2d 511 (Ct CJ). 
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the transaction is taxed as though the unnecessary step has not occurred.
128 
When the step transaction doctrine is employed to eliminate transitory or 
unnecessary steps, it overlaps and becomes almost indistinguishable from 
the business purpose doctrine (under which the unnecessary step is 
disregarded because lacking in business purpose) and the substance-over-
form principle (nullifying the unnecessary step as a formality that merely 
obscures the substance of the transaction).
129 
4 The sham transaction doctrine 
The sham transaction doctrine has little scope in United Kingdom law.
130 It 
usually means nothing more than that the label given by the parties to a 
transaction is not conclusive in determining the legal rights created by the 
parties.131 In contrast, it is difficult to work out what a "sham" means in the 
United States.132 The doctrine is believed to stem from Judge Learned 
Hand's description of the transactions in Gregory: 
133 
[T]heir only defect was that they were not what the [statute] means by a 
"reorganization", because the transactions were not part of the conduct 
of the business of either or both companies; so viewed they were a 
sham ... 
Bittker does not treat the sham transaction doctrine as a doctrine in its 
own right as he does with step transactions, substance over form and 
business purpose. John Tiley's view is that:
134 
128 The classic formulation of this variation of the step transaction doctrine is in Minnesota Tea Co v 
Helvering (1938) 302 US 609, 613: "A given result at the end of a straight path is not made a different 
result because reached by following a devious path." 
129 Boris Bittker Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, Boston, 
1981) 4-51. 
130 John Tiley "Judicial Anti - Avoidance Doctrines: The US Alternatives" (1987) BTR 180, 195. 
13 1 A transaction is a sham if the acts done were intended to give the appearance of creating legal rights 
different from those which were actually created. See Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd 
[1967] 1 All ER 518,520 (CA) Diplock Ll and Campbell Discount Ltd v Bridge [1962] 1 All ER 
385,402 (HL) Lord Devlin, cited in John Tiley Revenue Law (4ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 95. 
132 John Tiley "Judicial Anti - Avoidance Doctrines: The US Alternatives" (1987) BTR 180, 196. 
133 Helvering v Gregory (1934) 69 F 2d 809, 811(2d Circ) Judge Learned Hand. 
134 John Tiley "Judicial Anti - Avoidance Doctrines: The US Alternatives" (1987) BTR 180, 196-197. 
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When the United States lawyer concludes that a transaction is a sham he 
usually means that the form of the transaction is to be disregarded 
because it is a sham as compared with the underlying substance; the use 
of the term in this way seems to be nothing more than a rhetorical 
device of disapprobation to support a conclusion reached on other 
grounds - usually one of the general doctrines. 
D Where Does Lord Brightman's Formulation Fit In? 
If it is perceived as an exhaustive test for the application of the doctrine of 
fiscal nullity, Lord Brightman's formulation (described by Lord Brightman 
himself as "the rationale of the new approach")135 is a combination of the 
step transaction doctrine and the business purpose test.136 If the court finds 
as a fact that there is a pre-ordained series of transactions, it is entitled to 
amalgamate them into a single composite transaction. The business 
purpose test enables steps in a transaction that have no commercial 
purpose other than tax avoidance to be "disregarded" when applying the 
statutory provision (or, in Lord Brightman's words, "for fiscal 
purposes")137 to the arrangement. 
Lord Brightman's formulation is an amalgam of two common law anti -
avoidance rules imposed on statute that have their origin in another 
jurisdiction. It is not an approach to statutory construction, or a statement 
of the consequences of giving a commercial construction to a fiscal 
concept. 
Is Lord Brightman's formulation inconsistent with the Duke of 
Westminster principle? The two concepts are clearly irreconcilable. The 
Furniss test purports to remove steps in a transaction with a tax avoidance 
effect and look at the "end result". The transaction is recharacterised as a 
route that the taxpayer could have chosen to take, but did not in fact take. 
It is difficult to see how this is anything other than the application of an 
135 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474, (HL) Lord Brightman. 
136 This is how John Tiley views the doctrine. See John Tiley "Judicial Anti - Avoidance Doctrines: 
The US Alternatives - Part II" (1987) BTR 220, 244. 
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economic substance approach to the transaction, Although Lord Brightman 
did not directly comment on the impact of his judgment on the Duke of 
Westminster principle he overruled the Court of Appeal's decision that the 
doctrine of fiscal nullity should only apply to circular, self - canceling 
transactions with no enduring legal consequences and stated that:
138 
It is difficult to escape the impression that the High Court and the Court 
of Appeal were determined at all costs to confine the Ramsay principle to 
the sort of self - canceling arrangement which existed in that case, and to 
resist what they conceived to be a deplorable inroad into the sacred 
principles of the Westminster case. It is also difficult to escape the 
impression that in framing the rationale of his new approach after this 
comment, Lord Brightman impliedly overrules the Duke of Westminster 
principle in respect of arrangements that contain a tax avoidance purpose. 
E Are the Other Judgments in Furniss consistent with this view? 
The judgments in Furniss do not attempt to define the conceptual basis of 
the doctrine. In fact, several of the Law Lords expressly indicate that the 
judgments in Furniss are not an exhaustive exposition of the scope of the 
doctrine.139 This unwillingness to definitively determine the scope of the 
doctrine is more consistent with the view of the doctrine as an application 
of the purposive approach to statutory interpretation, than the view that it 
is a common law anti - avoidance rule similar to the business purpose test. 
Conversely, interpreting judgments is much like interpreting the Bible, in 
that statements made in the same judgment may support competing 
interpretations. Whether there is support in the judgments for the step 
transaction doctrine and the business purpose doctrine depends on how the 
137 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474, (HL) Lord Brightman. 
138 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474, (HL) Lord Brightman. 
139 See, for example, Lord Scarman's comment that "the law in this area is in an early stage of 
development. Speeches in your Lordships' House and the judgments in the appellate courts of 
the 
United Kingdom are concerned more to chart a way forward between principles accepted and n
ot to be 
rejected than to attempt anything so ambitious as to determine finally the limit beyond which t
he safe 
channel of acceptable tax avoidance shelves into the dangerous shallows of unacceptable tax e
vasion." 
Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474, (HL) Lord Scarman. 
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Law Lord treat the issue of substance over form, because the step 
transaction doctrine and the business purpose doctrine are fundamentally 
inconsistent with the Duke of Westminster principle. 
Ultimately, the Law Lords' statements that the doctrine will continue to 
develop must be read in the context of their continuous references to 
artificiality and examining the substance, rather than the form, of the 
transaction. All of the judgments are couched in terms of artificiality. Lord 
Roskill refers to exorcising the ghost of the Duke of Westminster. 140 In 
similarly strong words, Lord Bridge, while noting that "one must never 
lose sight of the important Duke of Westminster dictum, seems to advocate 
the application of the substance over form doctrine to composite 
transactions.141 
E Is Lord Hoffmann's Judgment in Westmoreland an approval of 
the business purpose test? 
In his comment on Westmoreland, John Tiley observes that: 142 
... if we are going to have American interpretation, can we please have 
an American code to go with it? In fact, if we had the American code as 
well, we would then have to stop learning two systems of tax and could 
learn just one. 
He also asserts that Lord Hoffmann "appears to endorse the American 
approach to interpreting tax statutes. "143 This accusation is unfair and, 
more importantly, it is incorrect. First, while Lord Hoffmann refers to the 
judgments of Learned Hand J in Gregory and Gilbert v Comr of Internal 
Revenue, 144 he does so in the context of discussing Lord Wilberforce's 
approval of the authorities in Ramsay and explains Judge Learned Hand's 
decision in Gregory as having its basis in statutory construction. Second, 
140 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474, (ill.,) Lord Roskill. 
141 Furniss (HMIT) v Dawson [1984] AC 474, (HL) Lord Bridge. 
142 John Tiley "First thoughts on Westmoreland" [2001] 3 BTR 153, 158. 
143 John Tiley "First thoughts on Westmoreland'' [2001] 3 BTR 153, 156. 
144 Gilbert v Comr of Internal Revenue (1957) 248 F 2d 399. 
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Lord Hoffmann views the doctrine of fiscal nullity as an application to tax 
statutes of a narrow, textual purposive approach to statutory interpretation. 
It is a very different approach from the wide purposive approach that the 
United States courts employ in construing legislation. It in an approach 
that focuses on analyzing the statutory concept at issue and does not 
attempt to find some underlying Parliamentary intention. Lord Hoffmann 
makes this clear by warning that "even if a statutory exception refers to a 
business or economic concept, one cannot disregard a transaction which 
comes within the statutory language, construed in the correct commercial 
sense, simply on the ground that it was entered into solely for tax 
reasons." 145 
VI ATTEMPTING A RECONCILIATION OF FURNISS AND 
WESTMORELAND 
A Reconciling the Two Approaches - Lord Hoffmann's Test 
Lord Hoffmann 's reconciliation of Lord Brightman 's approach in Furniss 
with his test in Westmoreland is unpersuasive. It simply fails when one is 
faced with a series of transactions, at least one of which has only a tax 
avoidance purpose and falls within the terms of a statutory provision that is 
based on a legal (juristic) concept. This is, in fact, an accurate summary of 
the facts of Westmoreland. In this scenario, the test in Furniss (assuming 
that all of the requirements for its application were satisfied) would apply 
to strike down the transactions having only a tax avoidance purpose and 
apply the statute to the "end result." Because the arrangement in 
Westmoreland was admittedly circular, the House of Lords in Furniss 
would probably hold that the arrangement had failed to result in a payment 
of interest to the scheme, because the transactions in the arrangement had 
no commercial purpose other than the gaining of a tax advantage. This is a 
145 Macniven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKHIJ6 865 par 59 (fil) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
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summary of the Crown's argument in Westmoreland, 146 which Lord 
Hoffmann rejected. Even more ironic is the fact that Lord Hoffmann 
expressly rejected the Crown's summary of the doctrine of fiscal nullity, 147 
which was basically a summary of the test in Furniss widened to include 
any steps that give rise only to a tax advantage. 
B Lord Hoffmann Does not Address the Problem 
Lord Oliver's judgment in Craven v White addresses the fundamental 
problem in attempting to reconcile Lord Brightman's formulation of the 
doctrine of fiscal nullity in Furniss with the view that the doctrine is a 
principle of statutory construction. 
1 The House of Lords Decision in Craven v White 
Craven v White involved a scheme similar to that in Furniss. The decision 
is notable for the split between the majority and the minority of the House 
of Lords. The majority held that the doctrine does not apply if there is no 
"composite" transaction.148 That is, in viewing the transaction as a whole, 
the Court must be able to conclude that a step or steps were inserted for no 
commercial purpose. Accordingly, if the arrangement comprises of a 
number of unique and independent steps, which cannot be regarded as part 
of a composite whole, then the doctrine does not apply. Lord Oliver, who 
delivered the leading majority judgment, confirmed that Bunnah and 
Furniss would not invalidate any transaction that had no purpose apart 
from the avoidance of tax. Furniss was explained on the ground that the 
sequence of events was so closely linked that it could legitimately be 
regarded as one single transaction - one single transfer by the taxpayer to 
the ultimate purchaser. In Craven, the transaction was not preordained. 
The initial transfer to the holding company and the subsequent sale to the 
146 Macniven (Inspector of Ta.xes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001) UKH116 865 par 27 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
147 Macniven (Inspector of Ta.xes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] UKH116 865 par 28 (HL) 
Lord Hoffmann. 
148 Craven (HMIT) v White [1988) BTC 268, 288 (HL) Lord Oliver, 278 Lord Keith, 324 Lord Jauncey. 
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ultimate purchaser took place at two different points in time and cou1d not 
be regarded as one transaction. Lord Oliver set out the conditions that must 
exist if transactions were to be merged as they had been in Furniss: 
149 
1) The series of the transactions must be preordained at the time the 
intermediate transaction was entered into; 
2) The transaction must have had no other purpose than tax mitigation; 
3) There must have been no practical likelihood that the preplanned 
events would not take place in the order ordained so that the 
intermediate transaction was not even contemplated practically as 
having no independent life; 
4) The preordained events must have in fact taken place. 
The other significant aspect of Lord Oliver's judgment is his assertion 
that the doctrine is "a principle of construction".
150 This is the first attempt 
to ascertain the doctrine's conceptual basis. Unfortunately, the majority's 
attempt to narrow its scope focused on limiting the test in Furniss by 
adding in extra requirements. This approach is more consistent with the 
doctrine being an anti - avoidance rule than with his assertion about its 
scope. 
2 Lord Oliver's judgment 
Lord Oliver outlined two competing views of the ratio of Furniss. On the 
first view, Furniss decided that any transaction one of whose purposes it to 
avoid or minimise tax on another transaction which was then in 
contemplation and which subsequently takes place, is to be ignored.
151 On 
the other view, Furniss decided only that:
152 
the approach to the construction of interdependent transactions 
sanctioned by the Ramsay case is properly to be applied to what has 
been described as a "linear" transaction as well as to a circular self -
cancelling transaction if the necessary conditions exist enabling the 
149 Craven (HMIT) v White [1988) BTC 268, 298 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
15° Craven (HMIT) v White [1988) BTC 268, 285 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
151 Craven (HMIT) v White [1988) BTC 268,288 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
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court realistically to regard the two transactions together as constituting 
one single composite and indivisible whole involving only a single 
disposal for tax purposes. 
Lord Oliver accepted that Furniss was an extension of the principle in 
Ramsay, because it recharacterised the transactions, attributing to the 
parties a result that they did not actually intend and applying the statute to 
that unintended result. According to Lord Oliver, the critical question was 
to identify the circumstances in which the principle in Ramsay permits this 
recharacterisation.153 He refused to accept the wide view of the scope of 
Furniss154 and viewed the doctrine as a principle of statutory construction. 
He held that therefore, the ratio in Furniss was based on the premise that 
the transfer of shares by the taxpayer to Greenjacket did not, on the true 
construction of the statute, constitute a "disposal."155 He asked the 
question "when is a disposal not a disposal within the terms of the 
statute?".156 In his view: 157 
To give to that question the answer "when, on an analysis of the facts, it 
is seen in reality to be a different transaction altogether" is well within 
the accepted canons of construction. To answer it "when it is effected 
with a view to avoiding tax on another contemplated transaction" is to 
do more than simply to place a gloss on the words of the statute. It is to 
add a limitation or qualification which the legislature itself has not 
sought to express and for which there is no context in the statute. 
He indicated that therefore, the elements of Lord Brightman' s 
formulation and the concept of a tripartite contract between the taxpayer, 
Greenjacket and Wood Bastow, are "not merely exemplary of the wider 
doctrine of Ramsay", 158 but were essential to the decision in Furniss. The 
tripartite contract concept was the only way in which the House of Lords 
was justified in reaching its conclusion in Furniss, because there had to be 
152 Craven (HMIT) v White [1988] BTC 268,288 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
153 Craven (HMIT) v White [1988] BTC 268, 288 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
154 Craven (HMIT) v White [1988] BTC 268, 295 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
155 Craven (HMIT) v White [1988] BTC 268, 289 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
156 Craven (HMIT) v White [1988] BTC 268, 295 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
157 Craven (HMIT) v White [1988] BTC 268, 295 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
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shown that there was no "disposal" of the shares from the taxpayers to 
Greenjacket within the terms of the legislation.
159 If the shares were treated 
as Greenjacket's shares with no subsisting arrangement for their onward 
transmission to Wood Bastow, then it would be impossible not to conclude 
that they had been "disposed of' to Greenjacket. He then presented four 
criteria necessary for the approach in Furniss to apply. 
Lord Oliver's attempts to limit the application of Lord Brightman's test 
are based on an acknowledgment that if the doctrine is expanded beyond 
that narrow formulation, it effectively becomes a statutory anti - avoidance 
provision. Hence, he wishes to confine Furniss to cases where "when the 
intermediate transaction takes place, the end result which in fact occurs is 
so certain of fulfilment that it is intellectually and practically possible to 
conclude that there has indeed taken place one single and indivisible 
process."160 
Lord Oliver's attempt to reconcile Lord Brightman's formulation with 
the view that the doctrine of fiscal nullity is a principle of statutory 
construction is inconsistent with Lord Hoffmann' s approach. If the 
legal/commercial concept distinction is applied, "disposal" is clearly a 
legal concept. According to Lord Hoffmann's test, it is therefore beyond 
the scope of the doctrine of fiscal nullity to aggregate the transactions and 
to employ a tripartite contract approach to hold that there is no disposal 
within the terms of the statute. Lord Oliver's judgment is important 
because it describes the problems inherent in construing Lord Brightman's 
formulation widely. Lord Hoffmann does not acknowledge the existence 
of these problems, and does not even refer to the House of Lords decision 
in Craven v White in his judgment. 
VII WESTMORELAND AND MCGUCKIAN 
158 Craven (HMIT) v White [1988] BTC 268, 298 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
159 The relevant legislation was Schedule 6 of the Finance Act 1965. 
160 Craven (HMIT) v White [1988] BTC 268, 298 (HL) Lord Oliver. 
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Lord Hoffmann approves of the result in McGuckian and expressly 
concurs with Lord Steyn and Lord Cooke's comments that the doctrine of 
fiscal nullity is "an application to taxing Acts of the general approach to 
statutory interpretation whereby, in determining the natural meaning of 
particular expressions in their context, weight is given to the purpose and 
spirit of the legislation." 161 He also notes that particular attention should be 
paid to Lord Cooke's rejection of Lord Brightman's test in Furniss as an 
exhaustive exposition of the circumstances in which the doctrine will 
apply. 
It is not surprising that Lord Hoffmann expressly approves of Lord 
Cooke's view of the doctrine of fiscal nullity, as it is exactly the same as 
his own. It is also unsurprising that he does not refer to Lord Browne-
Wilkinson's judgment at all, given that Lord Browne - Wilkinson used the 
test in Furniss 162, framed widely to enable the court to strike down any 
transaction whose purpose is to produce a tax advantage for the 
taxpayer, 163 to reach his conclusion. Lord Hoffmann's formulation is also 
inconsistent with Lord Steyn's view that the doctrine "was not based on a 
linguistic analysis of the meaning of particular words in a statute. It 
was founded on a broad purposive interpretation, giving effect to the 
intention of Parliament."164 Lord Steyn's approach looks like the purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation that is adopted by the United States 
courts, and he applies the formulation in Furniss to reach his conclusion. 
Lord Cooke is the only Law Lord whose reasoning is at least consistent 
with Lord Hoffmann's approach. 
Unlike Furniss, however, the result in McGuckian can still be reconciled 
with Lord Hoffmann's judgment in Westmoreland. In that sense, the cases 
are not inconsistent. It also helps to explain Lord Steyn's approach in the 
context of the facts. The explanation hinges on the statutory provision that 
was at issue in the case - section 478 of the Income and Corporation Taxes 
161 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991, 1002 (HL) Lord Cooke. 
162 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991, 1003 (HL) Lord Browne - Wilkinson. 
163 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991, 95(HL) Lord Browne - Wilkinson. 
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Act 1970 - expressly stated that it was enacted for the purpose of 
preventing tax avoidance. The existence of a specific anti - avoidance 
provision justified applying the approach in Furniss. 
VIII THE IMPLICATIONS OF WESTMORELAND FOR SECTION 
BGJ 
It has not yet been authoritatively detennined by a New Zealand court 
whether the doctrine of fiscal nullity has any application in New Zealand. 
The most recent pronouncement on its potential impact is in the Privy 
Council's decision in C of IR v Auckland Harbour Board.
165 The decision 
concerned the application of a specific anti - avoidance rule contained in 
the accrual rules. Lord Hoffmann compared section BG 1
166 to the specific 
anti - avoidance provision at issue and concluded that both provisions are 
aimed at transactions which, in commercial terms, are within the charge to 
tax but which have been structured so that on a purely juristic analysis they 
are not. He also commented on the relationship between statutory anti -
avoidance provisions (both specific and general) and the doctrine of fiscal 
nullity: 167 
Some of the work such provisions used to do bas nowadays been taken 
over by the more realistic approach to the construction of taxing acts 
exemplified by WT Ramsay v IR Commrs ... although their Lordships 
should not be taken as casting any doubt upon the usefulness of such tax 
avoidance provisions as a long stop for the Revenue. 
Lord Hoffmann seems to suggest that the doctrine of fiscal nullity 
should be applied as the primary tool in striking down anti - avoidance 
schemes. Section BG 1 is a backstop designed to come into operation in 
situations where the doctrine does not apply. This view is not incorrect if 
164 IRC v McGuckian [1997] 1 WLR 991, (HL) Lord Steyn. 
165 C of IR v Auckland Harbour Board (2001) 20 NZTC 17,008 (PC). 
166 Or, more accurately, its equivalent - section 99 of the Income Tax Act 1976. 
167 C of IR v Auckland Harbour Board (2001) 20 NZTC 17,008, 17,012 (PC) Lord Hoffmann. 
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the doctrine of fiscal nullity is an example of the purposive approach to 
statutory interpretation. 
This gives rise to the question of how section BG 1 should be 
interpreted in the wake of Westmoreland. The distinction between tax 
mitigation and tax avoidance that arose out of Lord Templeman's judgment 
in the Privy Council decision in Challenge Corporation v CIR168 was 
abolished by the Privy Council in O'Neil & Ors v CIR. 169 Lord Hoffmann 
rejected the distinction as "unhelpful" .170 If section BG 1 is interpreted 
narrowly, consistent with Richardson J's (as he then was) approach in the 
Court of Appeal in Challenge Corporation v CIR, the application of Lord 
Hoffmann's doctrine of fiscal nullity leaves no scope for its operation 
because Richardson J's decision closely mirrors Lord Hoffmann 's 
categorization in Westmoreland.171 However, this is clearly not the result 
that Lord Hoffmann intends when he refers to section BG 1 as "a long stop 
for the Revenue."172 
IX CONCLUSION 
Lord Hoffmann's attempt to reconcile his judgment with the decision in 
Furniss is unconvincing. This is not surprising, because the two judgments 
are clearly different in terms of their approach and result. Which approach 
is to be preferred? Lord Hoffmann's description of the doctrine of fiscal 
nullity as an example of the purposive approach to statutory construction 
will probably quell those critics who, especially after the decision in 
Furniss, described the doctrine as unconstitutional. It now occupies an 
acceptable place within the existing legal framework. However, his failure 
to acknowledge and deal with the difficulties inherent in the Furniss 
formulation of the doctrine is crucial. It means that Westmoreland is just 
168 Challenge Corporation v CIR [1986] 2 NZLR 556 (HL) 561 Lord Templeman. 
169 O'Neil & Ors v CIR (2001) 20 NZTC 17,051 (PC). 
170 O'Neil & Ors v CIR (2001) 20 NZTC 17,051, 17,057 (PC) Lord Hoffmann. 
171 Richardson J distinguishes between tax concepts and economic concepts. If the transaction sought to 
be struck down by section BG 1 is an artificial transaction that takes advantage of an economic 
concept, section BG 1 applies. 
172 C of JR v Auckland Harbour Board (2001) 20 NZTC 17,008, 17,012 (PC) Lord Hoffmann. 
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another swing of the pendulum which has, in spite of Lord Hoffmann's 
efforts to instigate certainty, created yet more uncertainty in this already 
difficult area. It is appropriate at this point to return to Lord Hoffmann 's 
quotation in Norglen v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd and to consider the 
meaning of its last sentence, which he strangely omits when he cites 
himself in Westmoreland. It is submitted that the last sentence 
encapsulates Lord Hoffmann 's disapproval of the approach inherent in 
Furniss; and its basis in the United States anti - avoidance doctrines. 
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